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“The Purer Fountains”: Bacon and Legal Education* 
 
Daniel R. Coquillette 
J. Donald Monan, S.J. University Professor 
Boston College 
Lester Kissel Visiting Professor 
Harvard Law School 
 
I. Introduction: An Orthodoxy Under Fire 
 
 
 Today, the classical underpinnings of American legal education are under intense critical 
review.1  The dominant pedagogy, the “case book” and the “Socratic method,” were established 
by Christopher Columbus Langdell (1806-1906) at Harvard Law School more than a century 
ago.2  Together with Langdell's first year curriculum, which was exclusively focused on Anglo-
American common law doctrine, and his emphasis on a competitive, anonymous graded 
“meritocracy,” this system still exercises an incredible grip on elite American law schools.  But 
Langdell's 19th Century model has now been challenged by many rivals, including critical legal 
studies, “law and economics” empiricism, “global” curriculums, and clinical instruction.3 
 
As is so often the case, Bacon anticipated these major forces of change.  In his great 
De…Augmentis Scientiarum (hereafter, “De Augmentis”), Bacon attacks the narrow parochialism 
of the common law pedagogy of his day.  "For at present there are nothing but schools and 
institutions for multiplying altercations and controversies on points of law, as if for the display of 
                                                 
* A preliminary version of this article was presented as the Francis Bacon Annual Lecture at the Huntington Library, 
San Marino, California on May 8, 2003.  I am most grateful to the Bacon Foundation and its devoted trustees and to 
Dr. David Sieburg and his colleagues at the Huntington Library. I am also particularly grateful to my Administrative 
Assistant, Brendan Farmer, and Deborah H. Goldstein, Boston College Law School, 2003.  Their intelligence and 
hard work was invaluable. 
1 See, for example, Patricia L. Refo, “Training the Next Generation of Lawyers: Perhaps Our Greatest Challenge,” 
29 Journal of the ABA Section on Litigation (2003) 1, discussing the new “Report of the Task Force on Training the 
Trial Lawyer,” pp. 1-2; Randall T. Shepard, “What the Profession Expects of Law Schools,” 34 Ind. L. Rev. 7 
(2000); and Harry T. Edwards, “The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession,” 91 
Mich. L. Rev. 34 (1992).  For a different perspective, see Fred C. Zacharias, “Why the Bar Needs Academics—and 
Vice Versa,” 40 San Diego Law Review (2003), 701. 
2 The best accounts of Langdell’s extraordinary career and influence on all American professional education, in 
particular, are by my friend and co-investigator in a generous Spencer Foundation Grant to study professional 
education, Bruce A. Kimball of the University of Rochester.  See Bruce A. Kimball, “ ‘Warn Students that I 
Entertain Heretical Opinions, Which They Are Not to Take as Law’: The Inception of Case Method Teaching in the 
Classrooms of the Early C.C. Langdell, 1870-1883,” Law and History Review (Spring, 1999), 57; “When Holmes 
Borrowed from Langdell: The ‘Ultra Legal’ Formalism and Public Policy of Northern Securities (1904), 45 Am. J. 
of Legal History (2001) 1; and “Young Christopher Langdell, 1826-1854: the Formation of an Educational 
Reformer,” 52 J. of Legal Education (2002), 189.  Other important Kimball articles are awaiting publication.  We 
are both grateful to the Spencer Foundation for their support. 
3 See Bruce A. Kimball, “The Langdell Problem: A Century of Historiography in Light of the Sources, 1906-
2000s,” Law & History Review (Winter, 2004), immediately forthcoming. 
 
wit.  And this evil is also an old one…” (Spedding ed., V, 108 De Augmentis Aphorism 93).4  
Attacking reliance on decided judicial cases and on the parochial, prevailing common law 
treatises and pedagogy, Bacon evolved a new system of legal instruction based on empirical 
observation, distilled into maxims or aphorisms, one that sought true global significance and 
universal scientific legitimacy.  “[T]here are certain fountains of natural equity from which 
spring and flow out the infinite variety of laws which individual legal systems have chosen for 
themselves.  And as veins of water acquire diverse flavors…according to the nature of the soil 
through which they flow…, just so in these legal systems natural equity is tinged and stained… 
according to the site of territories, the disposition of peoples, and the nature of commonwealth.  
It is worthwhile to open and draw out the purer fountains of equity, for from them all amendment 
of laws in any commonwealth must be sought”  The Aphorismi (Neustadt, ed., 273).5  This paper 
will set out Bacon's philosophy of legal education, analyze its fundamental pedagogical and 
doctrinal elements, and examine its lessons for American legal education today. 
 
 In so doing, it will be necessary to traverse a minefield of controversy.  As E.O. Wilson 
has so powerfully described in his book Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (1998), Bacon 
was “the grand architect” of an enlightenment dream that “called for the illumination of the 
moral and political sciences by the ‘torch of analysis.’”6  Bacon was also devoted to a belief in a 
“unity of knowledge,” relying on “the common means of inductive inquiry that might optimally 
serve all branches of learning.”7  In E.O. Wilson’s words, “Bacon envisioned a disciplined and 
unified learning as the key to improvement of the human condition.”8 
 
 But the “unity” of the modern legal academy has been fragmented into academic 
specialties and increasingly divorced from the experience of law practice.9  Post-modern and 
post-structuralist ideologies have attacked any pretense “neutral” and “objective” rule of law that 
could be taught in a formal, external setting, like mathematics or physics.  Increasingly, law, and 
legal education, are seen as devoid of external truths.  In E.O. Wilson’s words: 
                                                 
4 See The Works of Francis Bacon (Spedding, Ellis, Heath, eds., London, 1877), vol. 5, p. 108 (hereafter, “Works”).  
For the purpose of this article, I will cite to the classic and familiar “Spedding” edition of Bacon’s works, simply 
because it is still more complete and accessible to scholars than its eventual replacement, the splendid new The 
Oxford Francis Bacon, under the general editorship of Graham Rees and Lisa Jardine.  See, for example, Michael 
Kiernan’s outstanding new edition of The Advancement of Learning, vol. 4, The Oxford Francis Bacon (2000) and 
Graham Rees equally fine editions of the Philosophical Studies: c. 1611-1619, vol. 6, The Oxford Francis Bacon 
(1996).  I look forward to Rees’ forthcoming The Instauratio Magna, Part II: Novum Organum, vol. 11, The Oxford 
Francis Bacon (2004). 
5 Francis Bacon, “Aphorisms on the greater Law of nations or the fountains of Justice and Law,” edited by Mark S. 
Neustadt as part of his Ph.D. thesis, “The making of the instauration: science, politics, and law in the career of 
Francis Bacon” (John Hopkins, 1987, republished by University Microfilms Dissertation Information Services, 
1990), p. 273.  (Hereafter, the “Aphorismi.”)  The Aphorismi are based on Hardwick Manuscript 51, which was 
discovered in the Chatsworth House Library and recognized as a unique work of Bacon by Peter Beal.  See Id., 
p.241, and Peter Beal, Index of English Literary Manuscripts, 1450-1625 (London, 1980), pp. 17-52. 
6 Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York, 1998), p.23. (Hereafter, “Consilience.”) 
7 Id., p.27. 
8 Id., p.27. 
9 See Harry T. Edwards, “The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession,” supra, 
note 1, at pp. 34-35.  See also J. Cunyon Gordon, “A Response from the Visitor from Another Planet,” 91 Michigan 
L. Rev. 1953, 1960 (1993); Randall T. Sheppard, “What the Profession Expects of Law Schools,” supra, note 1, at 
p.11. 
 
 
“In the most extravagant version of this constructionism, there is no ‘real’ reality, 
no objective truths external to mental activity, only prevailing versions 
disseminated by ruling social groups.  Nor can ethics be firmly grounded, given 
that each society creates its own codes for the benefit of the same oppressive 
forces.”10 
 
Hence comes “the post-modernist prohibition against universal truth…” which can have 
particular force in modern legal pedagogy.11 
 
 Equally important, law practice itself has changed.  The “three qualities of modern law,” 
described prophetically by Max Weber (1864-1920) and articulated in his great Law and 
Economy and Society, seem to be coming true.12  First, the “legal ignorance of the layman” has 
increased, as legal rules become more specialized, complex and technical.13  Most lawyers in 
modern firms are divided into such specialties, and usually have little or no idea of what their 
partners and associates actually do.  Second, the “anti-formalistic tendencies of modern legal 
development” have led courts and tribunals to increasingly depart from “objective” or 
“universal” rules, and to rely instead on “economical utilitarian meaning.”14  Finally, there is the 
“lay justice and corporate tendencies in the modern legal profession.”15  Weber adds, “The use of 
jurors and similar lay judges will not suffice to stop the continuous growth of the technical 
element in the law and hence its character as a specialist’s domain.”16 
 
 Add to those changes the rapid shrinking of world cultures by improved communications 
and the welcome, and dramatic, increase in cultural diversity throughout American law schools 
and American society generally, and it becomes clear that conventional legal pedagogies and 
curricula will come under great stress.  The century old orthodoxy of American legal education 
could soon be shattered into a hundred unrelated pieces.  Can Bacon help us? 
 
II. “This Evil is an Old One”: Bacon’s Education 
 
 a) Bacon’s University Education 
 
 Bacon had a low opinion of his formal education, both at Trinity College, Cambridge, 
and at Gray’s Inn of the Inns of Court, where he studied law.  But in examining his ideas for 
education reform, it is logical to start with what happened to him. 
 
                                                 
10 Consilience, p.40. 
11 See, for example, Duncan Kennedy’s Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy (Cambridge, Mass. 
1983).  See also Robert M. Unger, Law in Modern Society (New York, 1976), “The Disintegration of the Rule of 
Law in Postliberal Society,” pp. 192-242. 
12 See Max Weber, Law in Economy and Society (trans. from Wintschaft and Gesellschaft by Shik) (Rheinstein, ed., 
Cambridge, Mass. 1969) 301, 302-304, 315-321. 
13 Id., p.301. 
14 See id., p.302-304. 
15 See id., p.315-321. 
16 See id., p.315-321. 
 
 As was customary for his day, Bacon was matriculated at university at what was, by 
modern standards, a very early age—thirteen.  In June of 1573, he “went up” to Trinity College, 
Cambridge with his older brother, fifteen year-old Anthony, whose progress had been delayed by 
severe health problems.  (Anthony, like his father, had severe asthma, which ran in the family.)  
The two boys roomed together at Trinity College, subject to the constant concern of their 
mother, whose anxious letters are still a primary source on Bacon’s life.17 
 
 Bacon stayed at Cambridge until March of 1576.  He left before obtaining a degree.  
From his later criticisms in The Advancement of Learning and De Augmentis, it was clear he 
experienced the typical curriculum and pedagogy of an undergraduate at Trinity College, under 
its first statutes of 1552.  Trinity was no ordinary college.  As Arthur Gray observed, under these 
statutes, “[e]laborate provision is made for a teaching staff within the College, and a schedule of 
the subjects of education is drawn up which conforms to the new curriculum of study which in 
the reign of Edward VI [1547-1553] was substituted for the old routine prescribed for trivium 
and quadrivium.”18  This course was rigorous. 
 
“All ‘disciples’—the term is much more convenient than its modern equivalent, 
‘persons in statu pupillari’—must have a tutor, who is to supervise their 
education and morals, and to be responsible to the College for their dues.  This is 
the first recognition in college statutes of the now familiar relationship of tutor 
and pupil, though it had unquestionably existed earlier.  The total number of 
pensioners is restricted by the regulation that no fellow is to have more than one 
pensioner-pupil, except the President, who may have four.  Lectures take place in 
the morning.  Those for bachelors are given in the parlour, for undergraduates in 
the hall.  A ‘master of the hall’ is to note the attendance, diligence and proficiency 
of the disciples, and to report thereon to the ‘seniority’.  If a disciple does not 
attend regularly he ‘loses his term’.  There are certain quaesitores aulae, called in 
the 1560 statutes lectores, who are to see that their classes make progress in the 
special subjects of Plato, Demosthenes and Cicero.”19 
 
  The overall curriculum was dominated by Aristotle and his deductive system: 
 
“The order of study is minutely prescribed.  In his first year the disciple reads 
dialectic and the elements of Euclid: this is considered to be the best introduction 
to Greek philosophy…  In his second year he is engaged on logic; in his third on 
                                                 
17 See Daniel R. Coquillette, Francis Bacon (Edinburgh and Stanford, 1992), pp. 23-69, 311-315; Catherine Drinker 
Bowen, Francis Bacon: The Temper of a Man (Boston, 1963), 23-37 (hereafter, “Bowen”).  See also the highly 
entertaining biographies by Daphne du Maurier, Golden Lads (London, 1975) and The Winding Stair: Francis 
Bacon, His Rise and Fall (New York, 1977). 
18 Arthur Gray, Cambridge University: An Episodical History, Cambridge, 1926, 93.  (Hereafter, “Gray.”)  See also 
J.M. Fletcher, “The Faculty of Arts,” The History of the University of Oxford (T.H. Ashton, gen. ed.), pp. 165-181.  
(Hereafter, “Fletcher.”) 
19 Gray, supra note 18, p.93. 
 
ethics, politics and rhetoric; in his fourth on physical science.  In all these subjects 
Aristotle is the textbook.”20 
 
 Besides the required lectures, students were required to participate in so-called 
“repetitions,” which were translations of Latin classics into Greek, and reverse.  Finally, there 
were “declamations” in hall three times a week, in Latin, English and Greek, “the subjects to be 
discussed…posted in the hall at dinner time.” 
 
“In the student’s first year he translates Demosthenes into Latin and the orations 
of Cicero into Greek; in the next year he similarly renders Plato and the 
philosophical works of Cicero.  The third and fourth years are devoted to revision.  
The disciple must provide himself, within two years, with copies of Aristotle, 
Plato, Demosthenes, Cicero, a Greek Testament and a Bible in Latin.  If he fails to 
do so he is removed from College.”21 
 
 Unless he chose to observe graduate lectures, Bacon would have had no opportunity to 
study law, which was taught as a graduate subject.  If he had, the course of study would have 
focused solely on Roman law, primarily the Institutes of Justinian, the Digest and the Codex, all 
in the original Latin.22  Even canon law studies, which had been taught at Oxford and 
Cambridge, had been prohibited by Henry VIII following the Act of Supremacy in 1535.23  The 
subject of Roman law was an old one, certainly dating back into the twelfth century at Oxford, as 
the Liber Paupernum of Vacarius testifies.24  And it was not entirely unrelated to practice.  The 
activities of the Doctors of Civil Law in Doctors’ Commons, who had developed monopolies in 
the Admiralty Court, the Court of Bequests and the Court of the Constable and the Marshal, were 
encouraged by the Tudors, as counterweights to the political influence of the common lawyers.  
For this practice, a university doctorate in the civil law of Rome was required.  But the university 
legal training was divided by language, subject matter and culture from the common law courts 
                                                 
20 Id., p.93-94.  In 1591, “sons of certain noblemen” at Oxford were “allowed to request the BA degree after three 
years.”  Fletcher, supra, note 18, p.165. 
21 Gray, supra, note 18, p.94. 
“Frequently in the early years of the century, students record in their graces the performance of an 
exercise known as a ‘variation’ (variatio).  This seems to be an exercise performed by one person 
only in which he presents various arguments for and against a set thesis.  Such variations were 
almost certainly made in parviso, since the Laudian statutes refer to disputations in parviso as 
those ‘once known as variations’.  No fixed number of such exercises seems to have been 
required; different students offer two, three, four, five or six.  Applications show that 
performances of some exercises in parviso were required throughout the Tudor period.  The few 
students who apply for the lower degree without having apparently performed at least one 
exercise are usually instructed by the university to become general sophisters before admission.  
Only rarely is this requirement relaxed, as when, for example, lack of time or the absence of a 
disputing colleague prevent the exercise taking place.  Then the university usually insists on 
alternative disputations being performed.”  Fletcher, supra note 18, p.170. 
22 See John Barton, “The Faculty of Law,” The Collegiate University (ed. J. McConica), vol.3 The History of the 
University of Oxford (ed. T.H. Ashton) (Oxford, 1986), pp. 267-269. 
23 “For the lawyers of the University, the most important consequence of the reformation was that courses ceased to 
be given in the canon law.”  Id., p.257. 
24 See F. de Zalueta, “Introduction,” The Liber Pauperum of Vacarius, vol. 44 Selden Society (London, 1927), pp. 
xv-xvii. 
 
of law.25  Eventually, Bacon learned a lot of Roman law, but he probably did not learn it at age 
fourteen or fifteen at Cambridge.  Even if he had, it would have been taught in the same way as 
his Aristotle, by lecture and replication.26 
 
 Much of Bacon’s mature philosophy was a pent-up rebellion against his university 
experience.  Aristotle, Bacon later observed, was “a philosophy only strong for disputations and 
contentions, but barren of the production of works for the benefit of man.”27  Even after the 
“reforms” of the Restoration, everything began with the sacred classical texts, and worked down 
from there.  The student, unlike Janus, faced only backward, not forward.  “Plus ultra” (“even 
further”) was Bacon’s battle cry.  One had to get past both the contents of the curriculum and the 
deductive pedagogy to do anything new.  Bacon’s first major philosophical work, The twoo 
Bookes of Francis Bacon, of the proficience and advancement of learning, divine and humane 
(London, 1605) [Gibson 81] (hereafter, “The Advancement of Learning”) was a sustained attack 
on this experience.28  When, later in his life, Bacon would turn to classical antecedents in both 
law and philosophy, it was to create a new model, not Aristotle’s Organum—drummed into his 
teen-aged head—but a Novum Organum, a new “tool,” a new way. 
 
 Bacon and his brother both left Cambridge in March of 1575, without taking degrees.  
Perhaps little should be made of this.  They were sons of privilege, and their father was one of 
the most powerful figures in the country.  That privilege soon led to Bacon’s appointment to the 
household of Sir Amios Paulet, ambassador to France.  for almost three years Bacon was able to 
study continental systems closely, and may well have picked up his taste for comparative 
analysis.  But the death of his father on February 20, 1579 brought him home.  Probably by 
accident, Bacon was ill-provided for by the estate—“I think I had greatest part in his love of all 
                                                 
25 See Daniel R. Coquillette, The Civilian Writers of Doctors’ Commons, London (Berlin, 1988), pp. 22-32.  The 
competition with the common lawyers became fierce in the early 17th Century, but the university civil law faculties 
survived.  In Brian Levack’s words: 
“During the first decade of the century it was widely rumoured that ‘the civil law should be put 
down and quite exterminated the kingdom’.  Whether there was any substance to these rumours, 
which arose because of the alleged ‘designs of evil men about the king’, cannot be determined.  
There is no question, however, that the profession of the civil law had fallen on hard times, and 
civilians were apprehensive that both their profession and the university faculty with which it was 
closely tied would be destroyed.  The main problem that civilians faced was intense competition 
from the common lawyers, who were encroaching upon their jurisdiction and also gaining some of 
the judicial appointments which had traditionally been reserved for civil lawyers.  Since many of 
the students studying law at Oxford did so in order to prepare for careers as proctors, advocates, 
and judges in the ecclesiastical and admiralty courts, an attack of this sort upon the sources of the 
civilians’ livelihood threatened the faculty itself.  As one contemporary predicted, if the civilians 
were to be deprived of their customary judicial fees, ‘they and that whole faculty must needs fall 
to the ground.’” (notes omitted.) 
Brian P. Levack, “Law,” vol. 4 The History of the University of Oxford (ed. T.H. Ashton) (Oxford, 1997), p.560. 
26 Roman law was taught almost exclusively to those more senior students who had already completed their B.A. 
degree.  See John Barton, “The Faculty of Law,” The Collegiate University (ed. James McConica), vol. 3 The 
History of the University of Oxford (T.H. Ashton, ed.) (Oxford, 1986), pp. 267-269. 
27 See the vivid account at Bowen, supra note 17, p.35.  “This scholastic aridity, this stultified repetition of classical 
authority, was offered to young minds at a time when the entire western world, let alone England, was opening to 
discovery and fresh knowledge of heaven and earth.”  Id., p.35. 
28 See Daniel R. Coquillette, Francis Bacon (Edinburgh and Stanford, 1992), pp. 77-90.  (Hereafter, “Coquillette.”) 
 
his children, yet in his wisdom served me as last comer.”29  In his own mind, Bacon had little 
choice but to make his own way.  He took advantage of his father’s vacant chambers in Gray’s 
Inn, and thus began his legal education. 
 
 b.) Bacon’s Legal Education 
 
 The evolution of the Inns of Court and of Chancery in London had created a system of 
legal education that was completely independent of the universities.  In John Baker’s words: 
“The fifteenth-century inns of court and chancery together formed a law school not much smaller 
in size than the University of Cambridge.  It would be called in Tudor times the Third University 
of England and with good reason, for it played at least as full a part as the other two older 
universities in the education of laymen destined for high or local office.”30  Thanks to John 
Baker, W.R. Prest, and Samuel Thorne, and their careful study of the readings and moots in the 
Inns, we now can recreate the world Bacon knew as a law student.31  (Bacon’s own accounts of 
his time from 1579 to his early admission as a barrister in 1584 consist primarily of letters to his 
uncle, Lord Burghley, seeking a position that would support his studies.) 
 
 In some ways, the process would have reminded Bacon of his university experience—
and, indeed, he would later find similar faults with both.  Value was placed on two things only, 
encyclopedic knowledge of the legal past—particularly statutes, pleadings, and some cases—
plus oral dexterity in “translating” and using these antiquities for good advantage.32  The 
“lectures” on Aristotle were replaced by “readings” on important statutes and processes; the 
“replications,” by pleading exercises and other drills, and the “thrice-weekly declamations in 
hall,” by the “moots,” or case arguments.  Participation in those exercises was not open to all, 
but was a function of advancement in rank.  As Baker described it: 
 
“We have already seen how the early lectures and disputations in the common law 
mirrored those in the university law schools.  Now, graduation in those medieval 
law schools was not a matter of passing an examination and then attending a 
degree ceremony, but a step (gradus) in the educational process.  It occurred not 
by the incantation of a formula of conferment, but by performance of the 
appropriate exercise by the candidate himself: a bachelor of arts took his degree 
by ‘determination’ of a question, masters and doctors by ‘inception’ (a beginning 
rather an ending).  There was a professional analogy in the graduation of serjeants 
at law: though attended with much ceremony, the effective part of a serjeant’s 
graduation was his first count at the bar.  Both schoolmen and serjeants needed 
                                                 
29 Bowen, supra note 17, 41.  See Coquillette, supra note 28, pp.23-24, 311-312.  Bacon’s inheritance amounted to 
£300 a year, “a perfectly good ‘living’ for minor Elizabethan gentry, but…hardly enough for Francis’ ambitions.”  
Id., p.24.  By contrast, his eldest stepbrother had an income of £6,000 a year.  Id., p.24. 
30 J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (3d ed., 1990), p.184.  (Hereafter, “Baker, Introduction.”) 
31 See S.E. Thorne, J.H. Baker, Readings and Moots at the Inns of Court in the Fifteenth Century, vol. 11 (London, 
1990), 150 Selden Society, pp. xv-lxxvi (Hereafter, “Readings and Moots, vol. 11”); S.E. Thorne, Readings and 
Moots in the Inns of Court, vol. 1 (London, 1952), 71 Selden Society; J.H. Baker, The Education of Lawyers 
(London, 1978), 94 Selden Society; and W.R. Prest, The Inns of Court 1590-1640 (London, 1972).  See also J.H. 
Baker, “Learning Exercises in the Medieval Inns of Court and Chancery,” in The Legal Profession and the Common 
Law (London, 1986), pp. 7-23. 
32 See J.H. Baker, “Introduction,” Readings and Moots, vol. 11, supra note 31, at pp. xlix-lii. 
 
someone’s permission to graduate; it was not free for all.  Nevertheless, the 
essence of the matter was that the bachelor, the doctor and the serjeant all created 
themselves, by performing the exercise or pleading which carried them up the 
step.  This must surely be how the degrees of barrister and bencher came about.  
As soon as a member of an inn was allowed to argue a moot at the bar, and did so, 
he thereby made himself a barrister; and as soon as he was allowed to sit on the 
bench at moots, and did so, he thereby made himself a bencher.”33 
 
This advancement up the common law ranks by “degree of learning,” may well have inspired 
Bacon’s notions of the “scalla intellectus,” but, as we shall see, Bacon’s system was quite 
different. 
 
 Preparation for the “moots” was also divided by experience.  “Inner barristers,” the 
lowest rank, helped prepare useful cases for the more senior lawyers, who had passed the bar and 
thus were “utter barristers.”  These utter barristers would actually argue the cases in hall, before 
the “elders of the house,” the benchers.  The “inner barristers” also had to “recite” the pleadings.  
A report of 1540, quoted by J.H. Baker, gives the following picture: 
 
The whole company and fellowship of learners is divided and sorted into three 
parts and degrees: that is to say, into benchers, or (as they call them in some of 
the houses) readers, utter barristers, and inner barristers. 
 
Benchers or readers are called such as before-time have openly read… Utter 
barristers are such that for their learning and continuance are called by the said 
readers to plead and argue in the said house doubtful cases and questions, which 
amongst them are called moots, at certain times propounded and brought in before 
the said benchers as readers; and are called utter barristers for that they, when 
they argue the said moots, they sit uttermost on the forms which they call the bar.  
And this degree is the chiefest degree for learners in the house next the 
benchers…All the residue of learners are called inner barristers, which are the 
youngest men that for lack of learning and continuance are not able to argue and 
reason in these moots; nevertheless, whensoever any of the said moots be brought 
in before any of the said benchers, then two of the said inner barristers, sitting on 
the said form with the utter barristers, do for their exercises recite by heart the 
pleading of the same moot-case, in law-French, which pleading is the declaration 
at large of the said moot-case, the one of them taking the part of the plaintiff and 
the other the part of the defendant… 
 
The ordering and fashion of mooting 
 
In these vacations every night after supper, and every fasting day immediately 
after six o’clock, boyer ended (festival days and their evens only excepted), the 
reader with two benchers, or one at the least, cometh into the hall to the cupboard; 
and there most commonly one of the utter barristers propoundeth unto them some 
                                                 
33 Id., p. lvi (notes omitted). 
 
doubtful case, the which every of the benchers in their ancienties argue, and last 
of all he that moved.  This done, the readers and benchers sit down on the bench 
in the end of the hall, whereof they take their name, and on a form toward the 
midst of the hall sitteth down two inner barristers, and of the other side of them on 
the same form two utter barristers.  And the inner barristers do in French openly 
declare unto the benchers—even as the serjeants do at the bar in the king’s courts 
to the judges—some kind of action, the one being as it were retained with the 
plaintiff in the action and the other with the defendant; after which things done, 
the utter barristers argue some questions as be disputable within the case—as 
there must be always one at least—and, this ended, the benchers do likewise 
declare their opinions how they think the law to be in the same questions.  And 
this manner of exercise of mooting is daily used during the said vacations. 
 
This is always observed amongst them, that in all their open disputations the 
youngest of the continuance argueth first, whether he be inner barrister or utter 
barrister or bencher, according to the form used amongst the judges and serjeants.  
And also that at their moots the inner barristers and utter barristers do plead and 
reason in French, and the benchers in English…”34 
 
 Not all “moots” were formal moots in hall.  Less formal “library moots” had “students 
arguing before utter barristers” and informal discussions “at the cupboard.”35  Then there were 
“board’s end cases” and “clerk’s common cases” that “evidently involved the putting of specific 
questions by senior barristers or new benchers, without pleadings, and were therefore not moots 
in the strict sense of the term.”36  These were found at Gray’s Inn as early as the 1530s.37  
Finally, there were “bolts” or “boltings,” which were specific doctrinal questions put to the 
students as a kind of drill, without the case pleadings.38  According to David Walker and Earl 
Jowitt, these “bolts” were also private, unlike the public “moots.”39 
 
 Pedagogically, this common law system also worked much like its intellectual rivals in 
the universities.  The students’ primary task was to master a vast body of preexisting knowledge 
in specialist languages (in this case Law French and Latin), with a good deal of highly technical 
jargon—particularly related to the “art” of pleading.  The literature was also highly specialized 
and, with very few exceptions, there were no conceptual guides through the morass—those were 
                                                 
34 Id., pp. lx-lxi (notes omitted). 
35 Id., p. lxxiv. 
36 Id., p. lxxiv. 
37 Id., p. lxxiv. 
38 Id., p. lxxv. 
39 “Unlike moots… they [bolts] were held in private.”  David H. Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford, 
1980), p.140.  (Hereafter, “Walker.”)  The term is said to derive from the Saxon “bolt, a house.”  See Earl Jowitt, 
The Dictionary of English Law (Ed. C. Walsh, London, 1959), p. 259 (Hereafter, “Earl Jowitt”).  Earl Jowitt 
defines bolts as “arguments of cases in the halls of the Inns of Court, by students and barristers consisting of an 
ancient, or bencher, and two barristers.  They, like the moots, were for educational purposes: but the bolts…were 
conducted in private.”  Id., p.259. 
 
to come more than a century later.40  Littleton’s Tenures, Perkins’ Profitable Book, and 
Fitzherbert’s Natura Brevium were essentially outlines or, in the latter case, a form book.41 
 
 In such a situation, the best “learning aids” were “readings” that efficiently conveyed 
information and rituals, drills and play-acting to fix facts and forms in your mind.  The law was 
anchored in vast, immutable custom, at least in theory, which must be sorted through, classified, 
and memorized.  No reader of Coke’s Institutes, particularly Coke on Littleton, can fail to admire 
the vast common law memory that drove those works.  Critical analysis was, by definition, 
worse than useless, it would invariably clog the machine’s inherent assumption of legitimacy.  
Everything was deduced from the preexisting common law, which was studied in a complete 
vacuum from either social observation or scientific reasoning.  Indeed, studies of the student 
notebooks at Litchfield Law School and Harvard Law School before its dramatic rescue by 
Joseph Story, show the same patterns.  The “lecturer” sets out the law; the “crammer” reinforces 
it in the memory by questioning and drill; and the “moot court” dramatizes the abstract 
principles by role acting.42 
 
 Despite the paucity of records chronicling Bacon’s five years as an “inner barrister,” we 
do have some idea of what he thought of all this.  First, he saw the system as immensely 
wasteful, commenting, “I am purposed not to follow the practice of law, it drinketh too much 
time, which I have dedicated to better purpose.”43  This was, in part, because the system lacked 
conceptual “short cuts” to guide the efficient mind—which Bacon would later term “Maximes” 
or “Aphorismi”—and partly because, as he commented on the parallel deductive studies of 
Aristotle, “being a philosophy strong for disputations and contentions [such as “moots” and 
“bolts”], but barren of the production of works for the benefit of the life of man.”44  In other 
words, this was a system of learning that was not, in any direct sense, an instrument of social 
good.  Finally, in the absence of any direct link between the law, as a body of knowledge, and 
observation of the law’s impact on human affairs, there could be no critical analysis of the 
                                                 
40 See Baker, Introduction, supra n.30, at pp. 214-217; Daniel R. Coquillette, Anglo-American Legal Heritage 
(Durham, 1999), pp. 272-274 (Hereafter “Coquillette, Heritage”). 
41 See W.S. Holdsworth, Sources and Literature of English Law (Oxford, 1925), pp. 112-161; T.F.T. Plucknett, A 
Concise History of the Common Law (5th ed., Boston, 1956), pp. 276-281.  An exception was Christopher St. 
Germain’s remarkable Dialogues between a Doctor of Divinity and a Student of the Common Law (London, 1523, 
1530).  Id., pp. 279-280.  This treatise, which gave a most important secular overview of the principles of equity, 
may have influenced Bacon.  See Daniel R. Coquillette, The Civilian Writers of Doctors’ Commons, London 
(Berlin, 1988), pp. 48-57, 257-259.  See also St. German’s Doctor and Student (T.F.T. Plucknett, J.L. Barton, 
1974), vol. 91 Selden Society, pp. xx-xxix. 
42 John Langbein at Yale Law School is engaged in major research involving early American legal education in 
general, and the Litchfield School, in particular.  In addition, Lynne Templeton Brickley has also been engaged in 
fundamental research on the Litchfield Law school.  Her exhibition as Project Historian for the Litchfield Historical 
Society, “The Noblest Study, The Legacy of America’s First School of Law,” recently won the Wilbur Cross 
Award.  Karen Beck, Curator of the Coquillette Rare Books Library at Boston College. is also engaged in research 
on early student notebooks from Litchfield and elsewhere.  See Karen S. Beck, “One Step at a Time: The Research 
Value of Law Student Notebooks,” 91 Law Library Journal (1999), 29; and her exhibit catalogue, “Notable Notes: 
A Collection of Law Student Notebooks” (1999).  See also David Warrington’s talk to the 1992 Annual Meeting for 
the American Society for Legal History, “Under-Utilized Sources for Research in Legal History: Law Student 
Notebooks” (unpublished M.S.). 
43 Bowen, supra note 17, p.48. 
44 Id., 35. 
 
system’s efficacy or inherent legitimacy.  Again, as Bacon observed, “for at present there are 
nothing but schools and institutions for multiplying altercations and controversies on points of 
law, as if for the display of wit.  And this evil is also an old one.  For it was likewise the pride of 
antiquity, as by sects and factions, to keep alive a number of questions of law, rather than settle 
them.”45  Bacon was explicitly referring to the Sabinians and the Proculeans of the Roman 
Republic, but could also surely be thinking of the moots and bolts of Gray’s Inn!  The ancient 
learning rituals of Bacon’s law student days were, like the Aristotelian replications of his 
university, shackles to the intellect.  “The philosophers lay down many precepts fair in argument, 
but not applicable to use: the lawyers, being subject and addicted to the positive rules…have no 
freedom of opinion, but as it were talk in bonds.”46 
 
 The “old exercises of [legal] learning” did not long survive the Civil War and the 
Interregnum.47  As J.H. Baker has demonstrated, the “moots” in today’s law schools owe more to 
eighteenth century debating societies than to any timeless rituals of the inns of courts.48  But the 
challenges of formalism and ritual thinking in legal education are very much with us.  Out of his 
own experience, Bacon proposed a better way for his day and, quite curiously, for ours: a new 
pathway for professional learning. 
 
III.  Bacon’s Plans for the Classification and Storage of Legal Learning: The Advancement of 
Learning and A Proposition to His Majesty 
 
 Bacon’s most important early works focused on the dual topics of education and law 
reform.  In 1605, terrorist conspirators planned to blow up both Houses of Parliament, and James 
I, on Opening Day.49  Bacon would have been there.  Had he died in that blast, which was 
narrowly averted, The Advancement of Learning (1605), the Essays (1597) and the Maximes of 
the Law (written in 1596-1597, and published posthumously in 1531), would have ensured his 
reputation.50 
 
 Although Bacon was fluent in Latin and the professional law French, he wrote The 
Advancement of Learning in English.  This choice was doubtless political, the book was both 
dedicated to James I and directed at him and the politicians in his court.51  Perhaps it was a 
symbolic rebellion as well against the tongue of the inns of court, whose rote education systems 
he challenged.  “Here, therefore [is] the first distember of learning, when men study words and 
not matter…”52  In this challenge he admitted his debt to the Counter-Reformation “college of 
the Jesuits” who, like himself, have made “a just complaint that states were too busy with their 
laws and too negligent in the point of education.”53  The ultimate goal would be a legal learning 
                                                 
45 Works, supra note 4, vol. 5, p.108. 
46 Id., vol. 5, p.88. 
47 Readings and Moots, vol. 11, supra note 31, at pp. lxxv-lxxvi. 
48 Id., at p. lxxvi. 
49 Coquillette, supra note 28, at p.77. 
50 Id., at pp. 325, 332-333. 
51 Id., at p.78. 
52 Id., at p.80. 
53 Works, supra note 4, vol. 3, p.277.  See also, vol. 3, p.300, 416; vol. 4, p.494, 496.  “It is quite appropriate that a 
Jesuit, Maurice B. McNamara, S.J., has made a major contribution to Bacon scholarship.”  See Coquillette, supra 
note 28, at p.273, n.200.  Bacon admired Jesuit education, continuing: 
 
free of both the abstract deductions of the “school” philosopher, bringing forth “cobwebs of 
learning, admirable for the fineness of thread and work, but of no substance or profit,”54 and the 
narrow bonds of traditional legal education in the Inns of Court. 
 
“[F]or the more public part of government, which is Laws, I think good to note 
only one deficience; which is, that all those which have written of laws, have 
written either as philosophers or as lawyers, and none as statesmen.  As for the 
philosophers, they make imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths; and their 
discourses are as the stars, which give little light because they are so high.  For 
the lawyers, they write according to the states where they live, what is received 
law, and not what ought to be law: for a wisdom of a lawmaker is one, and of a 
lawyer another.”55 
 
 The ideal balance would be both learning and research, freed from rote forms dictated by 
the past, that focused on “the actual application of laws in practice and their constant 
improvement.”56  In Bacon’s view, as I have noted elsewhere, this would “increase the social 
value of the legal theorist” while also improving “the quality of the theorist’s jurisprudence by 
constant testing against the truths.”57 
 
“[T]he wisdom of a lawmaker consisteth not only in a platform of justice, but in 
the application thereof; taking into consideration by what means laws may be 
made certain, and what are the causes and remedies of the doubtfulness and 
incertainty of law; by what means laws may be made apt and easy to be executed, 
and what are the impediments and remedies in the execution of laws; what 
influence laws touching private right of meum and tuum have into the public state, 
and how they may be made apt and agreeable; how laws are to be penned and 
delivered, whether in Texts or in Acts; brief or large; with preambles or without; 
how they are to be pruned and reformed from time to time; and what is the best 
means to keep them from being too vast in volumes or too full of multiplicity and 
crossness; how they are to be expounded, when upon causes emergent and 
judicially discussed, and when upon responses and conferences touching general 
points or questions; how they are to be pressed, rigorously or tenderly; how they 
are to be mitigated by equity and good conscience; and whether discretion and 
strict law are to be mingled in the same courts or kept apart in several courts; 
again, how the practise, profession, and erudition of law is to be censured and 
                                                                                                                                                             
“[W]hich excellent part of ancient discipline hath been in some sort revived of late times by the 
colleges of the Jesuits; of whom, although in regard of their superstition I may say, quo meliores, 
eo deteriores [the better the worse;] yet in regard of this, and some other points concerning human 
learning and moral matters, I may say, as Agesilaus said to his enemy Pharnabazus, talis quum sis, 
utinam noster esses [they are so good that I wish they were on our side].”  Id., vol. 3, p.277. 
54 Works, supra note 4, vol. 3, p.475.  See Coquillette, supra note 28, at p.80, 273 n.200 (notes omitted). 
55 Coquillette, supra note 28, p.84. 
56 Id., p.84. 
57 Id., p.84. 
 
governed; and many other points touching the administration, and (as I may term 
it) animation of laws.”58 
 
 But Bacon was not just concerned with the goals of legal learning, but with pedagogy, 
the best ways to “deliver” knowledge.  Here he turned to his favorite tool, the aphoristic method. 
 
“Another diversity of Method, whereof the consequence is great, is the delivery of 
knowledge in Aphorisms, or in Methods; wherein we may observe that it hath 
been too much taken into custom, out of a few Axioms or observations upon any 
subject to make a solemn and formal art; filling it with some discourses, and 
illustrating it with examples, and digesting it into a sensible Method; but the 
writing in Aphorisms hath many excellent virtues, whereto the writing in Method 
doth not approach.”59 
 
 The aphorism aided the mind by condensing knowledge into memorable “bites,” without 
the seduction of mindless repetition, as in the traditional “replications” of the university or the 
“exercises” of the Inns of Court.  The aphorism stretched the mind, and imposed its own rigor. 
 
“For first, it trieth the writer, whether he be superficial or solid: for Aphorisms, 
except they should be ridiculous, cannot be made but of the pith and heart of 
sciences; for discourse of illustration is cut off; recitals of examples are cut off; 
discourse of connexion and order is cut off; descriptions of practice are cut off; so 
there remaineth nothing to fill the Aphorisms but some good quantity of 
observation: and therefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt, to write 
Aphorisms, but he that is sound and grounded.  But in Methods, Tantum series 
juncturaque pollet, Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris [the arrangement 
and connexion and joining of the parts has so much effect,] as a man shall make a 
great shew of an art, which if it were disjointed would come to little.  Secondly, 
Methods are more fit to win consent or belief, but less fit to point to action; for 
they carry a kind of demonstration in orb or circle, one part illuminating another, 
and therefore satisfy; but particulars, being dispersed, do best agree with 
dispersed directions.  And lastly, Aphorisms, representing a knowledge broken, 
do invite men to enquire farther; whereas Methods, carrying the shew of a total, 
do secure men, as if they were at furthest.”60 
 
 As we will see, the aphoristic method became a center piece of Bacon’s expansion of The 
Advancement of Learning (1605) in his mature work, De Augmentis (1623), this time in Latin for 
the ages.  But Bacon began using aphorisms much earlier in his first legal work, the Maximes, 
written between 1596 and 1597. 
 
 Bacon certainly did not invent the method.  Common lawyers as early as 1546 circulated 
little treatises, such as the Principia sive Maxima Legum Anglie, organized around isolated 
                                                 
58 Works, supra note 4, vol. 3, pp. 475-476. 
59 Id., vol. 3, p.405. 
60 Id., vol. 3, p.405 (Latin translation as given by Spedding).  See Coquillette, supra note 28, pp. 83-84. 
 
“principal grounds and maxims.”61  But Bacon gave it a new style with his twenty-five maxims, 
notes written in English, but the maxims in Latin.  Ironically, he claimed to have originally 
written the book in Law French, although no copies survive. 
 
“Fourthly, whereas I know very well it would have been more plausible and more 
current, if the rules with the expositions of them had been set down either in Latin 
or in English, that the harshness of the language might not have disgraced the 
matter, and that civilians, statesmen, scholars, and other sensible men might not 
have been barred from them; yet I have forsaken that grace and ornament of them, 
and only taken this course: the rules themselves I have put in Latin (not purified 
further than the propriety of terms of law would permit; but Latin); which 
language I chose, as the briefest to contrive the rules compendiously, the aptest 
for memory, and of the greatest authority and majesty to be vouched and alleged 
in argument: and for the expositions and distinctions, I have retained the peculiar 
language of our law, because it should not be singular among the books of the 
same science, and because it is most familiar to the students and professors 
thereof, and besides that it is most significant to express conceits of law; and to 
conclude, it is a language wherein a man shall not be enticed to hunt after words 
but matter.  And for excluding any others than professed lawyers, it was better 
manners to exclude them by the strangeness of the language, than by the obscurity 
of the conceit; which is such as, though it had been written in no private and 
retired language, yet by those that are not lawyers would for the most part have 
been either not understood, or, which is worse, mistaken.”62 
 
 But Bacon was certainly aware that his maximes were student and analytical aids, and no 
more adequate to store the bulk of the law than Justinian’s Institutes could replace the Digest and 
the Codex.  James’ accession to the throne in 1603, uniting the Crowns of England and Scotland, 
not only gave Bacon hope of advancement, but presented the potential problem of uniting the 
laws of the two kingdoms.  Eager to gain favor with James, and also to improve the “storage” of 
English law in what today we would call a “manageable data base,” Bacon wrote no less than 
four tracts on the classification and storage of legal knowledge.  The first, and least useful, was 
his A Brief Discourse touching the Happy Union of the kingdoms of England and Scotland, 
published in 1603, followed by A Memorial touching the Review of Penal Laws and the 
Amendment of Common Law (written in 1614), A Proposition to His Majesty Touching the 
Compiling and Amendment of the Laws of England (written 1616-1617), and An offer to the king 
of a Digest to be Made of the Laws of England (written in 1621).63 
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 Bacon’s first point was that the law was: 1) “stored” in statutes, arranged chronologically 
with no effort at identifying anachronistic or inconsistent clauses, and with no method to search 
the statutes by topic; or 2) “stored” in yearbooks and law reports,64 also arranged 
chronologically, with no effort to locate overruled cases, anachronistic cases, cases that simply 
repeated the same proposition many times over, or cases that simply did not make sense as 
reported.65  The library at Gray’s Inn, doubtless familiar to Bacon, was organized that way, with 
a modest additional section for the black letter guides to students, like Littleton’s Tenures, 
Abridgements of the year books, and “Registers of Writs” and guide books for pleaders.66  
Indeed, if we were to ignore Sheppard’s Citator, the various Westlaw and Lexis computer 
searchable data bases, and the multi-volume treatises, this structure would be familiar to any 
modern law librarian and student, although on a different, and even more problematic scale. 
 
 As a first step to potential unification with Scotland, but also as a first step to a new 
vision of legal education, Bacon proposed to change all this. 
 
“Wherefore, for the Common Law of England, it appeareth it is no Text law, but 
the substance of it consisteth in the series and succession of Judicial Acts from 
time to time which have been set down in books which we term Year Books or 
Reports so that as these Reports are more or less perfect, so the Law itself is more 
or less certain, and indeed better or worse.  Whereupon a conclusion may be 
made, that it is hardly possible to confer upon this kingdom a greater benefit than 
if his Majesty should be pleased that these books also may be purged and 
reviewed, whereby they may be reduced to fewer volumes and clearer 
resolutions…”67 
 
 This was a massive task, equal to that of the great Codex and Digest (529-535 A.D.) of 
Justinian, on which continental jurisprudence rested.68  It could only be achieved: 
 
“By taking away many cases obsolete and of no use, keeping a remembrance of 
some few of them for antiquity sake. 
 
By taking away many cases that are merely but iterations, wherein a few set down 
will serve for many. 
 
By taking away idle Queries, which serve but for seeds of incertainty. 
                                                 
64 Id., pp. 111-113. 
65 Id., pp. 114-115. 
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major deaccessions or accessions of old books.  See D.R. Douthwaite, Catalogue of the Books of the Honourable 
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67 Works, supra note 4, vol. 12, p.85. 
68 For a discussion of the classical Roman texts, with reference to Bacon, see Daniel R. Coquillette, The Anglo-
American Legal Heritage (Durham, NC, 1999), pp. 4-10 (Hereafter, “Legal Heritage”). 
 
 
By abridging and dilucidating cases tediously or darkly reported. 
 
By purging away cases erroneously reported and differing from the original verity 
of the Record. 
 
Whereby the Common Law of England will be reduced to a corse or digest of 
Books of competent volumes to be shielded, and of a nature and content rectified 
in all points.”69 
 
 Bacon’s most complete vision of this massive reform of fundamental “data base” of 
English law was expressed in his Proposition to his Majesty…Touching the Compilation and 
Amendment of the Laws of England (1616) (hereafter A Proposition).  By now Bacon was 
Attorney General and was elevated to Privy Counsellor, but his criticism of his own legal system 
was scathing: 
 
“But certain it is, that our laws, as they now stand, are subject to great 
incertainties, and variety of opinion, delays, and evasions: whereof ensueth, 
 
1. That the multiplicity and length of suits is great. 
 
2. That the contentious person is armed, and the honest subject wearied and 
oppressed. 
 
3. That the judge is more absolute; who, in doubtful cases, hath a greater stroke 
and liberty. 
 
4. That the chancery courts are more filled, the remedy of law being often obscure 
and doubtful. 
 
5. That the ignorant lawyer shroudeth his ignorance of law in that doubts are so 
frequent and many. 
 
6. That men’s assurances of their lands and estates by patents, deeds, wills, are 
often subject to question, and hollow; and many the like inconveniencies.”70 
 
Bacon’s solution was a massive program: first, to sort through the “ancient records” and to select 
and register those of “most worth and weight” to be used as “reverend precedents, but not for 
binding authorities”; second, to create a set of scrutinized and approved law reports “the perfect 
course of law,” rejecting those which were anachronistic, over-ruled, repetitious, “idle queries, 
which are but seminaries of doubts,” and “reported with too great prolivity”;71  third, to create a 
similarly purged “codex” of all the statutes; and, finally, to produce three authoritative “auxiliary 
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books,” and “Institutions,” based on Justinian’s great text book of 533 A.D., an official law 
dictionary, “De verborum significationibus,” based on the famous Chapter XVI of Book Fifty of 
Justinian’s Digest, and—last but not least—a De regulis juris, probably in aphoristic form.  Of 
the latter Bacon observed: 
 
“For the treatise De regulis juris, I hold it of all other things the most important to 
the health, as I may term it, and good institutions of any laws: it is indeed like the 
ballast of a ship, to keep all upright and stable; but I have seen little in this kind, 
either in our law or other laws, that satisfieth me.  The naked rule or maxim doth 
not the effect.  It must be made useful by good differences, ampliations, and 
limitations, warranted by good authorities; and this not by raising up of quotations 
and references, but by discourse and deducement in a just tractate.  In this I have 
travelled myself, at the first more cursorily, since with more diligence, and will go 
on with it, if God and your Majesty will give me leave.”72 
 
 Bacon saw these great projects as the cornerstone of his new system of legal education.  
Even after his impeachment and disgrace in 1621, he dreamed of completing at least part of his 
plan.  In his sad An offer to the King of a Digest to be Made of the Laws of England, sent with 
his letter of March 20, 1621 thanking James for preventing his continued imprisonment in the 
Tower, Bacon wrote: 
 
“And because in the beginning of my trouble, when in the midst of the tempest I 
had a kenning of the harbour which I hope now by your Majesty’s favour I am 
entering into, I made a tender to your Majesty of two works, An history of 
England and A digest of your laws; as I have (by a figure of pars pro toto) 
performed the one, so I have herewith sent your Majesty, by way of an epistle, a 
new offer of the other.  But my desire is further, if it stand with your Majesty’s 
good pleasure, since now my study is my exchange and my pen my factor for the 
use of my talent, that your Majesty (who is a great master in these things) would 
be pleased to appoint me some task to write, and that I shall take for an oracle.”73 
 
Bacon never gave up his dream of what today we would call a concise, authoritative, systematic, 
quality-reviewed, fully searchable data base of law.  The American law student of today 
crouches in a vast library of hundreds of thousands of chronological law reports and statutes, and 
impenetrable state and federal “codes,” using computer search engines that generate endless 
unreviewed and unreliable answers.  To this student, adrift in a sea of information, Bacon’s 
vision is still a dream. 
 
IV.  Bacon’s Theory of Education: The Scalla Intellectus 
 
 Having described Bacon’s heroic efforts to reform the vast and desperately untidy attic 
that was the legal knowledge of his day, we now come to Bacon’s theories of education.  In 
general, these are the products of some of Bacon’s more mature works, the Novum Organum 
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(1620), the De Augmentis (1623) and the Chatsworth House Hardwick MS 51, the Aphorismi 
(written circa 1614, and masterfully described by Mark S. Neustadt in 1987).74 
 
 In the fifth book of De Augmentis, Bacon observed that “men’s labour in rational 
knowledge is either to invent that which is sought, or to judge that which is invented, or to retain 
that which is judged, or to deliver over that which is retained.”75  From this observation, he 
derived the four “logical” or “rational arts”: 1) the “Art of Inquiry or Invention”; 2) the “Art of 
Examination or Judgment”; 3) the “Art of Custody or Memory”; and 4) the “Art of Elocution or 
Tradition.”76  (The latter is better translated as “transmission,” as Wheeler observed.77) 
 
 Put in modern terms, the “four rational arts” correspond to the basic functions of a 
modern research university, of the kind described in the New Atlantis.78  The art of “inquiry or 
invention” is the research function.  The “art of examination or judgment” is the function of 
critical analysis, a function essential to the mature and wise use of research.  The “art of custody 
or memory” is represented by the modern research library and, as Wheeler would put 
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it,“database archival resources.”79  Finally, there is the art of “transmission,” the art of 
transmitting learning from teacher to student, or pedagogy. 
 
 As we have seen, Bacon’s earlier works focused on the obvious faults of the common law 
“memory”—a vast, unsearchable and illogically organized “database archival resource.”80  But, 
as the Advancement of Learning (1605) demonstrates, Bacon was also concerned with 
sophisticated and efficient “transmission” of that knowledge, hence his work on the aphoristic 
method in the Maximes of the Law (written 1596-1597) and elsewhere.81 
 
 Today, we would all agree that a first rate university or professional school would require 
a great knowledge “memory,” a “data base archive” as intelligently accessible as possible.  And 
we would also agree that first class “transmission,” or teaching, skills were highly desirable, to 
pass essential knowledge from one generation to the next—or at least the techniques of 
extracting that knowledge from the great “data base archive” or, even better, by direct empirical 
research.  But it is Bacon’s latter two “rational” arts that form the most compelling rationale for 
first class education: the art of “invention,” the creation of new data and insights by research, and 
the art of “examination or judgment.” 
 
 Most of us can imagine a fine educational institution handicapped by a poor research 
library and misguided and inefficient methods for transmitting knowledge.  (Indeed it clearly 
resembles the early Harvard Law School, with its grossly defective library—looked after by the 
janitor—and a “crammer” method of class recitation.)  But what we cannot imagine is a truly 
first class institution that is indifferent to serious research and fails to develop critical judgment 
in both the students and faculty.  These latter two “rational” arts, the nature of true research and 
developing critical judgment, were the focus of Bacon’s mature insights in the Novum Organum 
(1620) and De Augmentis (1623). 
 
 Of course Bacon understood that “invention” and “judgment” require a framework of 
knowledge.  The first rungs of his “ladder of understanding,” the Scala Intellectus, required 
amassing that critical mass of knowledge.82  This is where the “transmission” techniques for 
conveying knowledge effectively came in, and the abilities necessary to access the knowledge 
store of the archival “memory.”  Bacon would not regard the learning rituals of his early days in 
the university and Gray’s Inn as useless or unnecessary—but rather as wasteful, unimaginative, 
and inefficient in achieving their goals.  Nor would he regard the law libraries of the Inns of 
Court as unnecessary, but rather as pathetically lacking in what today we would term 
“searchable” data bases and, more importantly, contaminated with poor quality data, data that 
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was fragmented, unreviewed, anachronistic, misleading, and—as a matter of social utility—
profoundly disconnected to any social good.83 
 
 But let us assume that we adopt Bacon’s many suggestions on aphoristic pedagogy and 
on the storage and classification of legal knowledge.  Bacon still would be profoundly 
dissatisfied unless there was similar progress with research and critical judgment.  Indeed, once 
past the first few rungs of the Scalla Intellectus, all four of the “rational arts” must be integrated. 
 
 Perhaps this is most obvious with the development of the “invention” or “research” 
function.84  Bacon, as we know, believed that theory must be constantly informed and corrected 
by inductive, empirical research. 
 
“For all those who before me have applied themselves to the invention of arts 
have but cast a glance or two upon facts and examples and experience, and 
straightway proceeded, as if invention were nothing more than an exercise of 
thought, to invoke their own spirits to give them oracles.  I, on the contrary, 
dwelling purely and constantly among the facts of nature, withdraw my intellect 
from them no further than may suffice to let the images and rays of natural objects 
meet in a point, as they do in the sense of vision; whence it follows that the 
strength and excellency of the wit has but little to do in the matter.”85 
 
Part of Bacon’s genius was that he did not restrict such inductive “invention” to the natural 
sciences, but foresaw that the empirical study of mankind and human conduct was equally 
possible and valuable, thus anticipating the social sciences, including linguistics and sociological 
jurisprudence.86  Whether it be a study of Aristotle’s Ethics or Henry VIII’s Statute of Uses, the 
proof was “in the pudding” of actual human affairs.87  The gap between the university and 
professional training of his day and the world of inductive observation and actual practice was, 
to Bacon, like a bad divorce, “the unkind and ill-starved divorce and separation of which has 
thrown into confusion all the affairs of the human family.”88  The cure was “a true and lawful 
marriage between the empirical and the rational faculty.”89 
 
“There are and can be only two ways of searching into and discovering truth.  The 
one flies from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms, and from 
                                                 
83 See Works, supra note 4, vol. 4, pp. 13-21 (”Preface” to “The Great Instauration”).  “For in like manner the 
sciences to which we are accustomed have certain general positions which are specious and flattering, but as soon as 
they come to particulars, which are as the parts of a generation, when they should produce fruit and works, then 
drive contentions and barking disputation, which are the end of the matter and all the issue they can yield.”  Id., vol. 
4, p. 14. 
84 Id., vol. 4, p.407 (De Augmentis, 1623, chap. 1). 
85 Id., vol. 4, p.19. 
86 See Coquillette, supra note 28, pp. 233-234. 
87 See Bacon’s extraordinary “Learned Reading…Upon the Statute of Uses,” one of the required Double Readings 
to advance at Gray’s Inn.  It was delivered in the Lent vacation, 1600.  See Works, supra note 4, vol. 7, at 391.  In 
this reading, Bacon decried the erosion of the public policy goals of the great Statute of Uses (1536) by the use of 
blatant legal fictions.  See the full discussion at Coquillette, supra note 28, pp. 48-59. 
88 Works, supra note 4, vol. 4, p.19. 
89 Id., vol. 4, p.19. 
 
these principles, the truth of which it takes for settled and immoveable, proceeds 
to judgment and to the discovery of middle axioms.  And this way is now in 
fashion.  The other derives axioms from the senses and particulars, rising by a 
gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last of 
all.  This is the true way, but as yet untried.”90 
 
 But imaginative, empirical research alone was not sufficient.  That “rational art” must 
join with the “Art of Examination or Judgment.”91  As all true teachers know, instilling critical 
judgment in students is the greatest task.  Bacon saw it as, first, overcoming the characteristic 
impediments to human understanding by self-knowledge and teamwork, and, second, developing 
the intellectual courage necessary for true intellectual independence.  Only with adequate self-
knowledge and intellectual independence could the “judgment” faculty be adequate, in student or 
teacher, and only with good critical judgment can research, or invention, proceed on a sound 
footing.  The two “faculties” are mutually dependent. 
 
 But, of course, there were powerful obstacles to self-knowledge, which Bacon described 
by his famous “idols.” 
 
“The idols and false notions which are now in possession of the human 
understanding, and have taken deep root therein, not only so beset men’s minds 
that truth can hardly find entrance, but even after entrance obtained, they will 
again in the very instauration of the sciences meet and trouble us, unless men 
being forewarned of the danger fortify themselves as far as may be against their 
assaults.”92 
 
 I will not here review in depth Bacon’s “four idols”: the “Idols of the Cove”—the defects 
of the individual psyche; the “Idols of the Tribe,” that “have their foundation in human nature 
itself, and in the tribe or race of men”; the “Idols of the Market-place,” that are “formed by the 
intercourse and association of men with each other” (here Bacon anticipates modern 
linguistics—“words plainly force and overrule the understanding, and throw all into confusion, 
and lead men away into numberless empty controversies and idle fancies.”); and, finally, the 
“Idols of the Theatre,” the idols which have immigrated into men’s minds from the various 
dogmas of philosophies, and also from wrong laws of demonstration.”93  It is the latter, the 
“Idols of the Theatre,” that Bacon believed to be the most dangerous to education.  A quick 
review of these “Idols of the Theatre” will show why they are so dangerous, and particularly 
why they are dangerous to good legal education. 
 
 The “Idols of the Theatre” were so named because, in Bacon’s view, doctrines and 
dogmas are inherently artificial.  They are over-simplifications and imitations of reality, 
inherently artificial, although they would have you believe they are real…just like a stage play.  
In Bacon’s words: 
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“These I call Idols of the Theatre; because in my judgment all the received 
systems are but so many stage-plays, representing worlds of their own creation 
after an unreal and scenic fashion.  Nor is it only of the systems now in vogue, or 
only of the ancient sects and philosophies, that I speak; for many more plays of 
the same kind may yet be composed and in like artificial manner set forth; seeing 
that errors the most widely different have nevertheless causes for the most part 
alike.  Neither again do I mean this only of entire systems, but also of many 
principles and axioms in science, which by tradition, credulity, and negligence 
have come to be received.”94 
 
 Bacon certainly regarded the classical pedagogy of his university training, including the 
“repetitions” and “declamations,” as this type of dangerous “theater,” and the “moots” and 
“bolts” of the inns of court as well.95  Today, he would be joined by the many post-modern 
critics of contemporary legal education.  Such education remains dominated by the “Socratic” 
drills and the “case method” of Langdellian formalism.  It is also still focused, in the first year at 
least, on appellate cases which—in their remoteness and intellectual “focus,” can be as detached 
from reality and as artificial as any stage play.  Just ask a trial judge. 
 
 So what are Bacon’s answers?  First, self-conscious awareness of all the “idols” will, in 
Wheeler’s words, be “data clensing.”96  True, the human mind will always be an “enchanted 
glass,” incapable of purely accurate comprehension. 
 
“For it is a false assertion that the sense of man is the measure of things.  On the 
contrary, all perceptions as well of the sense as of the mind are according to the 
measure of the universe.  And the human understanding is like a false mirror, 
which, receiving rays irregularly, distorts and discolours the nature of things by 
mingling its own nature with it.”97 
 
But the inaccuracies of the “false mirror” can be mitigated by making conscious allowance for 
the defects, in the same way the mirror of a telescope can be repaired. 
 
 There is a particular trap in the study of law.  Bacon observed that “[t]he human 
understanding is of its own nature prone to suppose the existence of more order and regularity in 
the world than it finds.”98  Bacon was prophesying the inherent weaknesses of elegant 
Newtonian physics, a masterpiece of the Enlightenment.  But the seduction is even greater in 
legal study, where it becomes easy to lose sight of the forest of human needs through the 
intervening doctrinal trees.  Bacon was certainly aware of the peculiar dangers of legal 
education, as his “Preface” to the Maximes of the Law (circa 1596) makes clear, and it led to his 
controversial decision to omit all decided authority—all precedental cases—from that aphoristic 
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text book.99  If his legal proposals did not stand alone, vindicated by direct empirical evidence of 
utility and common benefit, the trappings of authority were the very idols that the student must 
self-consciously resist. 
 
“For these reasons I resolved not to derogate from the authority of the rules by 
vouching of the authority of the cases, though in mine own copy I had them 
quoted: for although the meanness of mine own person may now at first extenuate 
the authority of this collection, and that every man is adventurous to control; yet, 
surely, according to Gamaliel’s reason, if it be of weight, time will settle and 
authorise it; if it be light and weak, time will reprove it.  So that, to conclude, you 
have here a work without any glory of affected novelty, or of method, or of 
language, or of quotations and authorities, dedicated only to use, and submitted 
only to the censure of the learned, and chiefly of time.”100 
 
 It was also important how doctrine was taught.  Here we come full circle.  The rational 
faculty of “invention,” or research, required the rational faculty of “examination” or “judgment” 
to “cleanse” the data of the ever-present idols.  Only in this way could knowledge accurately be 
taught and stored.  Thus good research and teaching were inextricably linked.  In Bacon’s words, 
from the “Preface” of the Novum Organum (1620): 
 
“And the same humility which I use in inventing I employ likewise in teaching.  
For I do not endeavour either by triumphs of confutation, or pleadings of 
antiquity, or assumption of authority, or even by the veil of obscurity, to invest 
these inventions of mine with any majesty; which might easily be done by one 
who sought to give lustre to his own name rather than light to other men’s minds.  
I have not sought (I say) nor do I seek either to force or ensnare men’s judgments, 
but I lead them to things themselves and the concordances of things, that they 
may see for themselves what they have, what they can dispute, what they can add 
and contribute to the common stock.”101 
 
 Bacon was clearly aware of the two great legal pedagogies of his day, the civilian study 
of the Roman law and the common law study of precedents, authorities, and statutes.  As we 
have seen, he had little sympathy for the latter.102  But what about the Roman law and the 
civilian pedagogy of the ancient universities? 
 
 In Aphorism 93 of the “De Augmentis,” Bacon directs that “[T]he lectures and exercises 
of those who study and labour at the law be so ordered and instituted, as rather to set legal 
questions and controversies at rest, than to raise and excite them.”103  It could be argued, 
particularly because of the use of the word “instituted,” that this was a reference to the pedagogy 
symbolized by the classic civilian text, Justinian’s Institutes.  First conceived by the Emperor 
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Justinian himself, as part of his wholesale review of the classical Roman texts, between 528 AD 
and 535 AD, the Institutes were to be a first rung on the “ladder of learning” of Roman law 
students.  Keyed directly to the great Digest and Codex of the same period, the Institutes, 
published on Nov. 21, 533 AD, were a splendid “nutshell” guide to beginning students, all the 
more remarkable for being “spoken” directly by the Emperor, and thus law in its own right.104  
“Justinian’s design had been to embrace in his three authoritative works every jot and tittle of 
positive law.”105  All other law books were ordered to be destroyed. 
 
 Justinian’s teaching philosophy was plain.  Not for him the torturous “moots” and 
“bolts,” or the “Socratic” agonies of the modern law student.  Directly addressing his law 
students in the Prooemiism, the Emperor observed: 
 
“Having removed every inconsistency from the sacred constitutions, hitherto 
inharmonious and confused, we extended our care to the immense volumes of the 
older jurisprudence; and, like sailors crossing mid-ocean, by the favour of Heaven 
have now completed a work of which we once despaired.  When this, with God’s 
blessing, had been done, we called together that distinguished man Tribonian, 
master and ex-quaestor of our sacred palace, and the illustrious Theophilus and 
Dorotheus, professors of law, of whose ability, legal knowledge, and trusty 
observance of our orders we have received many and genuine proofs, and 
specially commissioned them to compose by our authority and advice a book of 
Institutes, whereby you may be enabled to learn your first lessons in law no 
longer from ancient fables, but to grasp them by the brilliant light of imperial 
learning, and that your ears and minds may receive nothing useless or incorrect, 
but only what holds good in actual fact.  And thus whereas in past time even the 
foremost of you were unable to read the imperial constitutions until after four 
years, you, who have been so honoured and fortunate as to receive both the 
beginning and the end of your legal teaching from the mouth of the Emperor, can 
now enter on the study of them without delay.”106 
 
 In “Title I,” the Emperor continued his theme: 
 
“Having laid down these general definitions, and our object being the exposition 
of the law of the Roman people, we think that the most advantageous plan will be 
to commence with an easy and simple path, and then to proceed to details with a 
most careful and scrupulous exactness of interpretation.  Otherwise, if we begin 
by burdening the student’s memory, as yet weak and untrained, with a multitude 
and variety of matters, one of two things will happen: either we shall cause him 
wholly to desert the study of law, or else we shall bring him at last, after great 
labour, and often, too, distrustful of his own powers (the commonest cause, 
among the young, of ill-success), to a point which he might have reached earlier, 
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without such labour and confident in himself, had he been led along a smoother 
path.”107 
 
How many American law students, frustrated and demoralized by the “hide the ball” teaching 
techniques of the orthodox first year “Socratic” method would weep at those words!  The 
civilian approach was not to require a student to reinvent biology by dissecting a frog, but to lay 
out a simple initial path, rational and clear, that would become increasingly complex once the 
initial steps were mastered.  Was this Bacon’s idea of the “Scalla Intellectus,” one rational step 
at a time? 
 
 It is certainly true that Bacon was enamored of the civilian learning, and that his great 
legal classification schemes, such as A Proposition to His Majesty, owed much to the structure of 
the Institutes, the Digest, and the Codex.108  As Bacon observed, in his letter to George Villiers, 
Duke of Buckingham and the King’s favorite: 
 
“[A]lthough I am a professor of the common law, yet am I so much a lover of 
truth and of learning, and of my native country, that I do heartily persuade that the 
professors of law, called civilians, because the civil law is their guide, should not 
be discountenanced or discouraged: else whensoever we shall have aught to do 
with any foreign king or state, we shall be at a miserable loss, for want of learned 
men in that profession.”109 
 
But Roman law instruction, based on Justinian’s “sacred texts,” was still a “top down,” 
deductive pedagogy, that assumed the “starting” point of the classical texts.  Of course, Bartolist 
jurists had long discovered how to apply Roman law to improve the emerging legal systems of 
Renaissance Europe.110  But the course of instruction—then, as during my Oxford Roman law 
studies in the 1960s—was based on close analysis of a closed, indeed dead, world.111 
 
 Not surprisingly, therefore, when Bacon actually attempted to establish an aphoristic 
guide to the first rungs of the scalla intellectus, he refused to blindly adopt civilian models.  On 
the other hand, he equally refused to reject such models outright, particularly when they were 
useful.  This common lawyers, like Edward Coke, would abhor.112  In his “Preface” to the 
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Maximes of the Law (circa 1596), Bacon noted that some of his maximes, or “rules,” were 
concurrent with Roman models. 
 
“…[W]hereas some of these rules have a concurrence with the civil Roman law, 
and some others a diversity, and many times an opposition; such grounds as are 
common to our law and theirs I have not affected to disguise into other words 
than the civilians use, to the end they might seem invented by me, and not 
borrowed or translated from them: no, but I took hold of it as matter of great 
authority and majesty, to see and consider the concordance between the laws 
penned and as it were dictated verbatim by the same reason.  On the other side, 
the diversities between the civil Roman rules of law and ours,--happening either 
when there is such an indifferency of reason so equally balanced, as the one law 
embraceth one course, and the other the contrary, and both just after either is once 
positive and certain, or where the laws very in regard of accommodating the law 
to the different considerations of estate,--I have not omitted to set down with the 
reasons.”113 
 
As will be seen, Bacon rejected the legal nationalism of the common law, and admired the global 
pretensions of the Roman law and its civilian jurists.  But the “global” law he sought to teach 
was based on experience and reason, not ancient text, or Bartolist adaptations.114 
 
 Nor was Bacon wedded to a rigorous, civilian curriculum, in which every law was in its 
exact place in a deductive hierarchy, and carefully related to each other class of laws.  Indeed, as 
Bacon noted below, even Justinian’s Digest was more “free-form” than that.  Thus, Bacon 
preferred a more open structure for his aphorismic introductory text—to encourage the students 
to think and, most importantly, to apply the principles to practice.  As Bacon observed: 
 
“[W]hereas I could have digested these rules into a certain method or order, 
which, I know, would have been more admired, as that which would have made 
every particular rule, through his coherence and relation unto other rules, seem 
more cunning and deep; yet I have avoided so to do, because this delivering of 
knowledge in distinct and disjoined aphorisms doth leave the wit of man more 
free to turn and toss, and to make use of that which is so delivered to more several 
purposes and applications.  For we will see all the ancient wisdom and science 
was wont to be delivered in that form; as may be seen by the parables of 
Solomon, and by the aphorisms of Hippocrates, and the moral verses of Theognis 
and Phocylides: but chiefly the precedent of the civil law, which hath taken the 
same course with their rules, did confirm me in my opinion.”115 
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 Not only did Bacon reject the extremes of both the civilian and common law pedagogies, 
he was one of the first jurists to recognize the importance of comparative analysis of rival legal 
systems.  Indeed, Bacon believed that there was a body of principles common to all legal 
systems and, like the Roman ius gentium, these principles could be discovered by careful 
observation and comparison of the actual operation of the law in different nations and systems.  
This was Bacon’s theory of the “purer fountains.” 
 
 Bacon explored this idea most thoroughly in his “Aphorisms on the greater law of 
nations or the fountains of Justice and Law,” known as the “Aphorismi.”  Written about 1614, 
these “Aphorismi” have only recently been discovered in Hardwick MS. 51, a manuscript in a 
library tended by Thomas Hobbes, Bacon’s former secretary116, and set out and annotated by 
Mark Neustadt in 1987.117 
 
 Bacon’s belief, as set out in the Aphorismi, was that there were universal principles of 
law, just like that of natural science.  While the narrowly educated lawyer learns and appreciates 
only the positive rules and laws “limited by the boundaries of regions and commonwealths,” true 
legal education must be global in scope, empirical in character, and comparative in technique.  
Of course, individual states adopt these principles of “natural equity” to their own needs, but this 
does not detract from their inherent universality. 
 
“There is little doubt, meanwhile, but that there are certain fountains of natural 
equity from which spring and flow out the infinite variety of laws which 
individual legal systems have chosen for themselves.  And as veins of water 
acquire diverse flavors and qualities according to the nature of the soil through 
which they flow and percolate, just so in these legal systems natural equity is 
tinged and stained by the accidental forms of circumstances, according to the site 
of territories, the disposition of peoples, and the nature of commonwealths.  It is 
worthwhile to open and draw out the purer fountains of equity, for from them all 
amendment of laws in any kingdom or commonwealth must be sought.”118 
 
 And who should teach in the “global law school”?  Certainly not “pure academics,” 
detached from empirical study and human reality, nor narrow, nationalistic legal practitioners. 
 
“Nearly all those who have written about laws have inclined either to fancies of 
philosophers or to the subtleties of lawyers.  In both there is some dignity but too 
little profit.  Doubtless the latter are chiefly concerned with human practice, but 
they are constrained and wasted upon trifling matters.  The knowledge of a 
legislator is different from that of an advocate, because the ordinances of a civil 
law, to which lawyers are bound to adhere, are limited by the boundaries of 
regions and commonwealths. 
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Certainly it partakes of a higher science to comprehend the force of equity that 
has suffused and penetrated the very nature of human society.  And it should not 
be concealed that both philosophers and lawyers seem little suited or proper for 
this work.  Philosophers, who wander the pleasant by-ways of contemplation, 
ornament civil activities more than they improve them; and lawyers, bound by 
their rules and formulae, do not employ a free and higher judgment.”119 
 
What was needed, instead, was a law school by and for “lawyer statesmen,” who understood the 
value of direct observation of human affairs.120 
 
“Truly this work and endeavor belongs chiefly to statesmen and those skilled in 
public affairs who have learned about human dispositions, compulsions and habits 
by much practice and attentive reading, listening, and observation.”121 
 
 Of course, this could be a description of Bacon himself.  Even his choice of the term 
“equity,” rather than “law,” for the “purer fountains” anticipated Bacon’s elevation to Lord 
Keeper in 1617, the head of the equitable Court of Chancery.  (“Law” was traditionally drawn 
from authority; “equity” was realm of reason and fairness.)122  But lawyer statesmen had a 
drawback, they were too busy to found law schools. 
 
“But these political men are often made for action and not suited for teaching.  
Moreover they are not rich in leisure, and are satisfied if they take care for their 
own times.  (Indeed, among them care for posterity commonly does not go 
beyond the boundaries of their own families.)”123 
 
Indeed, Bacon himself was too busy, as chief legal officer of the kingdom, and, eventually, 
Viceroy.  He left no detailed plans of any school or curriculum, only the extraordinary vision of 
a research university—the vast laboratories and “engine-houses” of “Salomon’s House” of 
Bensalem—set out in his haunting utopia, the New Atlantis (circa 1624).124  Like his other 
mature works, the New Atlantis was the product of the forced leisure of Bacon’s impeachment.  
And it was incomplete.  It cut off, either by accident or deliberately, just before the promised 
“frame of Laws,” or “the best state or mould of a Commonwealth.”125  Thus there was no 
description of the law school of utopia.  So let us do something outrageous.  Let us imagine how 
Bacon would resolve the post-modern crisis facing professional education in general, and 
American legal education in particular. 
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V.  The “New Pathways”: A Neo-Baconian Pedagogy 
 
 a.) In Medicine 
 
 In 1985, Harvard Medical School introduced a radical new approach to medical 
education, the “New Pathway” Program.126  First conducted as an experiment in its first two 
years (1985-86 and 1986-87), it aimed at integrating traditional “abstract” learning (anatomy, 
pathology, pharmacology, etc.) with a more “integrated” medicine, focusing on actual patients 
and healing.  The goal was to graduate doctors with “more positive attitudes toward all behaviors 
related to humanistic medicine, lifelong learning, and issues related to learning in a social 
environment.”127  In short, the effort was how to train doctors that could exercise all of Bacon’s 
four “rational arts” on a life long basis:  to access acquired knowledge (“art of custody or 
memory”); to test and improve that knowledge by direct experiment and research (“art of inquiry 
or invention”); to apply critical judgment to such raw experience (“art of examination or 
judgment”); and to be able to transmit that knowledge effectively—to teach (“art of elocution or 
tradition and transmission”).128  All this through a new curriculum, that moved students through 
the easiest rungs of the scalla intellectus by normal classroom pedagogy, but exposed them as 
quickly as possible to direct experience, in which their doctrinal learning could be quickly tested 
and improved.129 
 
 A particularly important part of the “New Pathway” focused on unifying technical 
medical knowledge with “humanistic medicine,” i.e., “humanism” and “social learning.”130  This 
was intended to go well beyond traditional psychiatry—a specialty increasingly driven by drug 
treatments—to efforts to teach young doctors to see and appreciate their patients in a broader 
social context, thus facilitating better communication and wiser judgments.131  In short, the “New 
Pathway” sought not only to unify the separate introductory subjects of the medical curriculum, 
by focusing on actual patients and empirical experience at an early stage, but also to unify 
medical training more generally with the social sciences and the humanities. 
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 To see how this would work in practice, let us examine the basic four year American 
medical school curriculum.132  It has been traditionally divided in two parts.  The first two years 
is largely classroom learning, taught mostly in lecture form by faculty with Ph.D.s in the 
sciences.  These are mandatory courses (no electives), and are focused on the “building” blocks 
of the sciences.  The goal is to pass Part One of the United States Medical Licensing 
Examination, administered by the National Board of Medical Examiners (“NBME”) (hereafter 
“the Boards”).  The examination is multiple choice, and tests “whether the student can 
understand and apply important concepts of the sciences basic to the study of medicine.”133  It is 
very hard, with a 20% failure rate.  Most medical students regard it as an exercise in memorizing 
and applying a “given” body of doctrine.  Multiple choice tests punish originality, and Part One 
of “the Boards” is no exception. 
 
 The next two years are largely clinical in nature, and consist of rotations in cooperation 
with one or more affiliated hospitals.  These usually include a required third year curriculum 
including “three months of internal medicine, three months of general surgery, and six weeks of 
OB/GYN, psychiatry, pediatrics and neurology.”134  Only in the fourth year do students have any 
serious choices. 
 
“The fourth year of medical school is really the first time when students are 
allowed to choose their desired path.  They choose elective rotations in other 
specialties, or, if they want to delve deeper into a specialty they experienced in 
third year, they may perform what is known as a sub-internship.  However, the 
rotations continue to be between six weeks and three months, so students are 
encouraged (forcibly) to experience many different specialties, thereby producing 
well-rounded and capable physicians.  During the fourth year, students decide 
what they want to specialize in and apply for “internships” and/or “residencies” in 
their desired specialization.”135 
 
 At the end of the fourth year, students must pass Part 2 of “the Boards.” 
 
“This exam focuses on the principles of clinical science that are deemed 
important for the practice of medicine under supervision in postgraduate training.  
It assesses whether medical school students can apply the medical knowledge and 
understanding of clinical science considered essential for the provision of patient 
care under supervision.  Many medical schools in the United States require 
students to pass Parts 1 and 2 prior to graduation.”136 
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 Students then apply for “internships” or “residencies.”  (Some “internships” are merely 
the first year of a residency.)  At the end of the first year, graduates take Part 3 of “the Boards,” 
which “assess whether …[they] can apply the medical knowledge and understanding of 
biomedical and clinical science considered essential for the unsupervised practice of 
medicine…”137  At this point a graduate can obtain a license to practice medicine in the United 
States.  Most graduates, however, continue residencies for at least three to six years, during 
which time they are notoriously exploited, with long hours and low pay.138  Even after that, some 
graduates continue with fellowships to develop sub-specialties, which narrows their expertise 
even more, and can take another one to five years.  Finally, there are intense written and oral 
examinations for “board certification” in a specialty, with failure rates of over 30%.139  The 
result is a hierarchical medical profession, ranging between “low technology” primary care 
physicians to narrowly defined specialists.  While the gaps in income and prestige are not as 
great as that between “GPs” and “Harley Street consultants” in the English profession, they are 
still real to the young doctor.140 
 
 The “New Pathway” was designed to combat the inherent fragmentation and narrowness 
of this process by focusing on the reforming the first two years.  As initiated at Harvard in 1988, 
it introduced students to clinical settings almost at once, replacing the traditional lectures and 
doctrinal “pigeon holes” with “a problem-based approach emphasizing small-group tutorials” 
and “self-directed learning complemented by laboratories, conferences and lectures.”141 
 
“Students are expected to analyze problems, locate relevant material in library 
and computer-based resources, and develop habits of collaboration and lifelong 
learning.  Clinical skills and the patient-doctor relationship are addressed in a 
three-year longitudinal sequence; instruction in patient history-taking begins in 
the first weeks of school.  This differs markedly from most medical schools, 
where students spend the majority of their first two years in a lecture hall.”142 
 
The students then took Part 1 of “the Boards” and continued into the third and fourth years of 
specialty rotation.  These “New Pathways” systems made few changes. 
 
 In 1998, a “randomized controlled trial” was conducted “to evaluate the long-term effects 
of an innovative curriculum, the New Pathway (NP) Program, on behaviors and attitudes related 
to humanistic medicine, lifelong learning and social learning.”143  This study compared 100 
randomly selected 1989 and 1990 Harvard Medical School graduates, 50% who had studied 
under the “New Pathway” program, and 50% who had “the traditional curriculum.”  The study 
did show significant differences—the most striking being the fact that “40% of the NP graduates 
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remained in low-technology, psychosocially oriented careers (primary care and psychiatry)—
more than twice the number of traditional graduates (18%).”  The study continued “[t]hus, unlike 
typical residents, the NP graduates were less influenced to leave primary care by the high-
technology, hospital based nature of residence education,” i.e., the highly fragmented system of 
specialties described above.144  Given the fact that the “New Pathway” only made major changes 
in the first two years of a professional education that, counting internship, residencies, and 
fellowships, could easily exceed ten years, these results are quite striking. 
 
 Bacon would certainly regard the New Pathway as a step in the right direction, but would 
certainly deride its limitations.  To begin, it only applies to the earliest stages in this particular 
Scalla Intellectus.  In terms of two of his “rational arts,” “the Art of Custody or Memory” and 
“the Art of Elocution or [transmission],” it should be a vast improvement over the lecture hall, 
by linking the transmission of basic data to actual experience as soon as possible.145  But pure 
research and critical judgment, the “Art of Inquiry or Invention” and the “Art of Examination or 
Judgment,” are developed over time, later down the long path of medical training.  Increasingly, 
medical experts concerned with fundamental cancer research have returned to Neo-Baconian 
principles.  In particular, research developed within the traditional hierarchies of the medical 
profession, and driven by the goals of funding agencies, has been disappointing.  Bacon would 
have predicted the failure of any program that was not based on “pure,” i.e., purely empirical 
research, free from such agendas and preconceptions.146  But the inherent narrowness of the 
medical certification system and the culture of hierarchies it promotes would make a “New 
Pathway” at this level—still dedicated to “lifelong learning, integrated knowledge, and a 
humanistic approach”—a challenge indeed. 
 
 b) In Law 
 
 Can legal education learn from the medical “New Pathway,” in particular, and Neo-
Baconian reform initiatives, in general?  The first year of law school approximates the first two 
years of the traditional medical program in that it is largely mandatory and focuses on time-
honored doctrinal “pigeon-holes,” “contracts,” “torts,” “civil procedure,” etc.  Although the 
conventional pedagogy is now less rigid than Langdell’s so-called “Socratic Method,” the data 
analyzed is still artificially structured appellate cases—quite far from the empirical trenches of 
the law.  Equally important, the “critical judgment” inspired by this pedagogy is often 
transparently phony.  Extremely large classes, and professors with a carefully programmed 
“theater” of exposition, are closer to the “replications” and “bolts” of Bacon’s day, than a system 
that truly rewards originality and inquiry.147  Finally, the importance of first year grades, and the 
rigor of that competition, is at least comparable to Part 1 of the medical “Boards.” 
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 The second two years in the conventional medical school curriculum really have no 
equivalency in the legal academy except in the clinical programs.  But these programs are 
certainly not universally required, and there are no compulsory rotations.  In addition, at many 
law schools clinicians do not hold tenure-track positions, and the programs they teach do not 
have the prestige of the regular classroom.  At Harvard Law School, only half the students take 
clinical programs of any kind.148 
 
 The second year is still quite necessary for learning required “building blocks,” such as 
taxation, professional ethics, corporations, constitutional law (in many schools) and legal 
accounting.  These courses—with the exception of professional ethics—are rarely required, but 
they so much form part of the language and culture of American practice that they are rarely 
skipped over. 
 
 It is, of course, the third year which is the problem.  Many law students complain bitterly 
that it would be better spent in a legal form of “internship,” i.e., “apprenticeship.”  As it stands, 
only an emphasis in some law schools on supervised research and writing gives the third year 
any structure or focus.149  Ironically, it has been the required first year curriculum that is seen to 
be the most successful by graduates.  Equally ironic, most serious efforts at reform, such as Todd 
Rakoff’s “Experimental First Year” at Harvard or Judith Ahreen’s “Optional First Year” or 
“Curriculum B” at Georgetown, have focused on the first year.150 
 
 At the close of the third year, many law graduates take one or more state bar 
examinations.  These form the “minimal” qualifications to practice law and are a function 
equivalent of the far more difficult Part 3 of the medical “Boards.”  Most of these examinations 
are, at least in part, multiple choice, and they stick closely to an unimaginative memorization of 
doctrine.  “Lifelong learning” skills and critical judgment are not tested at all. 
 
 Only at this point does true apprenticeship begin, as graduates take junior positions in 
large firms or organizations.  But recent developments in law firm economics have led to early 
specialization, and widespread abandonment of required rotations—even though these rotations 
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filled the same needs as in medical training, i.e., providing enough generality to at least know 
where to go to solve problems of a patient/client that are outside your specialty.  And, of course, 
some law students just “hang out a shingle” and practice law.151 
 
 Bacon would find this existing system reminiscent of the flawed professional training of 
his day.  Only the specific nature of the “idols” have changed—with Langdell’s pedagogy and 
curriculum creating the “theater” of today’s first year classroom, rather than the received 
doctrine of the common law moots, bolts and readings of his day.  But these rituals, isolated 
from experience, make for poor learning. 
 
 Here is a modest proposal.  Let us assume that the first year—if modestly enriched by the 
kinds of interdisciplinary research and writing and clinical experiences proposed by Rakoff, 
Ahreen and others—does an acceptable job of transmitting “building blocks” of information or, 
at least, of teaching students where such information is stored, i.e., Bacon’s “Transmission” and 
“Memory” functions.  Let us further assume that the next two years do a poor job of inculcating 
Bacon’s most crucial “rational arts”: 1) the “Art of Inquiry or Invention,” i.e., the creative skills 
required to “think outside the box” and learn from life experience; and 2) the “Art of 
Examination or Judgment,” i.e., the art of critical analysis and wisdom.  In Bacon’s view, these 
two years could hardly be expected to be successful, fragmented into scores of electives, 
unrelated to each other by any overlapping concept, and divorced from actual experience—
except for optional clinical programs, ignored by many students and, shamefully, often the 
tenure track faculty. 
 
 So why not design a “New Pathway” for the second and third years, drawing from the 
Harvard Medical School experience?  Assuming that first year doctrinal, lawyering, and research 
and writing programs are adequate to transmit the basic legal vocabulary and date access skills 
(i.e., Bacon’s “Transmission” and “Memory”), the second year could offer a choice of 
“concentrations,” but—as with the third and fourth years of medical school—some rotation 
being mandatory.  These “concentrations” could integrate classroom instruction, supervised 
research, and clinical experience through faculty “institutes,” that had both academic and clinical 
components. 
 
 For example, assume a second year student decides—as many do—that litigation is not 
for him or her.  “Transactional” or “corporate” law is what attracts.  A “corporate” institute could 
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combine academic instruction in business planning, law and economics, secured transactions, 
corporate taxation, securities law and legal accounting, with a program of actually representing 
small businesses and neighborhood development schemes, as is done now at Harvard’s Hale & 
Dorr Center.152  Such an “Institute” would not just be a vehicle to transmit research and 
judgment skills to students, but would be a vehicle for faculty research as well, and would 
encourage collaboration among faculty and students alike—the “teamwork” Bacon found 
essential for genuine creativity.  Another student, interested in litigation, would be taught a 
different package of academic, research, and clinical skills, while a third, interested in a career in 
government legal service, could be supervised by an Institute that actually provided counsel to 
government agencies.  A mandatory “rotation” among at least two or three of these 
“concentrations” would provide a conclusion of the universal legal or jurisprudential principles 
represented by a rule of law.153 
 
 It might be objected that these “Institutes,” to the extent they actually practice law, would 
compete unfairly with the practicing bar, or provide uneven services.  Exactly the same charges 
could be leveled at the medical internships and residencies, but they provide invaluable services 
for the poor and middle class that regular doctors cannot or will not provide.  Existing legal 
clinics, applying strict means tests, have far too much work.  Or the “Institutes” could work in 
support of government projects, reducing the cost to the taxpayer. 
 
 The real objections are likely to be by legal educators themselves.  Such “Institutes” 
would raise the cost of legal education by requiring smaller student/faculty ratios and replacing 
classroom instruction by more costly clinics.  Simply integrating existing clinical programs 
would not be enough—these programs would have to have the added prestige of full equality 
with classroom and tenure-track instruction, and that, in turn, would require a change in faculty 
culture.154 
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 All to the good, Bacon would say.  If better education of students breaks down traditional 
law faculty formalism, develops new bonds between faculty formerly working in isolation, and 
encourages learning by direct experience as a primary goal, rather than an optional after thought, 
the results will not just be better legal education, but better legal research and critical judgment 
from students and faculty alike.  The “New Pathway” would lead to “New Tools” of analysis and 
invention!  And what about the cost?  As Bacon emphasized, the concern of society should not 
be the modest cost of better education, but the extraordinary social cost and danger of a 
blinkered formalism, indifferent to human welfare.155 
 
 Bacon, for all his intense frustration with contemporary legal education, was devoted to 
his Inn of Court, Gray’s Inn.  He participated in every activity, including: delivering the required 
statutory “double reading”—in great style156, arranging “Masques” and entertainment157, 
planting the Inn gardens and “making of their walks”158, and serving as Treasurer for the 
exceptionally long term of eight years, 1608-1616.159  “[F]ew men,” he observed, “are so bound 
to their societies, by obligations ancestral and personal…”160  Indeed, for all the attacks of his 
contemporary rivals, and of Whig historians long after his death, Bacon was loyal to his 
profession.  “I hold every man a debtor to his profession,” reads his Preface to the Maximes of 
Law, “from the which as men of course do seek to receive countenance and profit, so ought they 
of duty to endeavor themselves, by way of amends, to be a help and ornament thereunto.”161  
                                                                                                                                                             
of the current Harvard faculty have an average of 4.3 years’ experience in private practice; three 
of them have more than five years’ experience, and only four have none.  By contrast, the thirteen 
youngest members of the Harvard faculty have an average of about ten months’ experience in 
private practice; none of them has more than five years’ experience, and ten have none.  Looked at 
another way, the fifteen faculty members appointed before 1966 have an average of 2.75 years’ 
experience in private practice, and only five of them have none.  By contrast, the fourteen Harvard 
faculty members appointed after 1991 have an average of .786 years’ experience in private 
practice, and ten of the fourteen have none.  The future seems clear.  If current hiring trends 
continue, soon there will not be a single member of the Harvard Law School faculty who will 
have substantial experience doing what the vast majority of Harvard graduates will be doing: 
practicing law in the private sector.” 
Patrick J. Schlitz, “Legal Ethics In Decline: the Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of 
the Novice Attorney,” 82 Minn. L. Rev. 705 (1998), pp. 760-762.  Of course, Dean Schlitz is concerned about the 
effect on the students.  Bacon would find the disconnect between theory and experience of the profession damaging 
to research and the intellectual life of the faculty as well.  See text, supra, at notes 75-101. 
155 See text, supra, at note 27.  See also Bacon’s “Preface” to the Great Instauration,” Works, supra note 4, vol. 4, 
pp. 13-21.  (Novum Organum (1620).) 
156 See Coquillette, supra note 28, pp. 48-59; Works, supra note 4, vol. 7, pp. 391-445. 
157 In this, Bacon undoubtedly had business transactions with Shakespeare.  See the lively and reasonably accurate 
account in W.G. Thorpe, The Hidden Lives of Shakespeare and Bacon and their Business Connection; with Some 
Revelation of Shakespeare’s Early Struggles 1587-1592 (London, 1897), pp. 11-39.  This activity began at least as 
early as the Gray’s Inn Masque of 1588.  Id., p.13.  See also D. Plunket Barton, Charles Benham, Francis Watt, The 
Story of the Inns of Court (Boston, 1926), p.196 (Hereafter, “Inns of Court”). 
158 See R.J. Fletcher, “Introduction” to Francis Bacon: The Commemoration of his Tercentenary at Gray’s Inn 
(London, 1912), with example gardening accounts at pp. 12-15.  See also Inns of Court, supra note 157, pp. 194-
195. 
159 See Coquillette, supra note 28, pp. 316-317. 
160 Inns of Court, supra note 157, pp. 198-199. 
161 Works, supra note 4, vol. 7, p.319.  The feeling was mutual.  Gray’s Inn religiously observes Bacon’s 
anniversaries, and unveiled a statue to his honor in the front quadrangle on June 27, 1912 to mark his tercentenary at 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
How it would please him if the great educational insights of The Maximes; The Advancement of 
Learning; the Novum Organum; and the De Augmentis could serve professional education, 
particularly legal education, today!  And so it should, for the Harvard Medical School’s “New 
Pathway” and its hope for a better education for tens of thousands of American medical students, 
is a Baconian idea, and its application to the serious plight of our law students offers even more 
promise.  Bacon’s faith in the power of true research, in the ability of the human mind to 
overcome the idols of doctrinal theaters, in the value of integrating knowledge by true 
experience, in the focus of learning on human need, and in the need to pursue “global” 
perspectives that unite all study—these speak powerfully to the condition of all American 
professional schools today, and particularly to law schools. 
 
 As William Twining observed in his great Maccabean Lecture of 1989, despite the 
“structuralists, post-structuralists, deconstructionists, semioticians and even narratologists” it is 
not bad history to “converse” with great historical figures.  (He used the example of 
Bentham.)162  Indeed, “a failure to equip students with a basic method for conducting reasonably 
disciplined conversations” is a fault.163  Bacon was a man of his time, but, in his own words, his 
works were “dedicated only to use, and submitted only to the censure of the learned, and chiefly 
of time.”164 One of his goals was to converse with future generations about the nature of good 
education so  that “there may spring helps to man, and a line and race of inventions that may in 
some degree subdue and overcome the necessities and miseries of humanity.”165  We should 
listen carefully, for Bacon has much to say to us. 
 
Gray’s Inn.  See Francis Bacon: The Commemoration of his Tercentenary at Gray’s Inn (London, 1912); The 
Unveiling of the Statue of Francis Bacon (London, 1912).  Of course, Bacon’s alleged “totalitarianism,” as 
promulgated by Whig historians like Macaulay, has not endeared him to common lawyers ideologically.  See 
Coquillette, supra note 28, pp. 14-17, 293. 
162 Coquillette, supra note 28, pp. 292-293. 
163 See William Twining, “Reading Bentham,” Maccabean Lecture in Jurisprudence (1989), 75 Proceedings of the 
British Academy (London, 1989), pp. 97, 110-120. 
164 Works, supra note 4, vol. 7, p.323 (“Preface,” The Maxims of the Law).  See also Id., vol. 4, pp. 13-33 (“Preface” 
and “Plan of the Work,” The Novum Organum). 
165 Id., vol. 4, p.27 (“Plan to Work,” The Novum Organum). 
